All posts by Guest Contributor

-- by Dan Buell Towards the end of 2007, the management of Bay Area Credit Service embarked on an agressive strategy to dramatically enhance the company's market position and increase its collection revenues.  These goals could be achieved only through superior performance at competitive rates.  At the same time, though, the company needed to drastically reduce internal operating expenses while facing significant competition.  The company's major goals for 208 included: *  Earn a much larger share of business from one of the nation's top five cellular phone service providers; *  Become a major collections partner for one of the nation's largest banking institutions; *  Earn more than 50 percent of the market in the pre-charge-off, early-out segment for the nation's largest landline communications provider; *  Enhance the company's position in the secondary collections tier. It's an interesting case study.  Navigate to the link to learn more: https://www.experian.com/whitepapers/index.html

By: Kari Michel Most lenders use a credit scoring model in their decision process for opening new accounts; however, between 35 and 50 million adults in the US may be considered unscoreable with traditional credit scoring models. That is equivalent to 18-to-25 percent of the adult population. Due to recent market conditions and shrinking qualified candidates, lenders have placed a renewed interest in assessing the risk of this under served population.  Unscoreable consumers could be a pocket of missed opportunity for many lenders. To assess these consumers, lenders must have the ability to better distinguish between consumers with a clear track record of unfavorable credit behaviors versus those that are just beginning to develop their credit history and credit risk models. Unscoreable consumers can be divided into three populations: • Infrequent credit users:  Consumers who have not been active on their accounts for the past six months, and who prefer to use non-traditional credit tools for their financial needs. • New entrants:  Consumers who do not have at least one account with more than six months of activity; including young adults just entering the workforce, recently divorced or widowed individuals with little or no credit history in their name, newly arrived immigrants, or people who avoid the traditional system by choice. • Thin file consumers:  Consumers who have less than three accounts and rarely utilize traditional credit and likely prefer using alternative credit tools and credit score trends. A study done by VantageScore® Solutions, LLC shows that a large percentage of the unscoreable population can be scored with the VantageScore® credit score* and a portion of these are credit-worthy (defined as the population of consumers who have a cumulative likelihood to become 90 days or more delinquent is less than 5 percent).  The following is a high-level summary of the findings for consumers who had at least one trade: Lenders can review their credit decisioning process to determine if they have the tools in place to assess the risk of those unscoreable consumers.  As with this population there is an opportunity for portfolio expansion as demonstrated by the VantageScore® study. *The VantageScore® credit score model is a generic credit scoring model introduced to meet the market demands for a highly predictive consumer score. Developed as a joint venture among the three major credit reporting companies (CRCs) – Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.    

By: Wendy Greenawalt In the last installment of my three part series dispelling credit attribute myths, we’ll discuss the myth that the lift achieved by utilizing new attributes is minimal, so it is not worth the effort of evaluating and/or implementing new credit attributes. First, evaluating accuracy and efficiency of credit attributes is hard to measure. Experian data experts are some of the best in the business and, in this edition, we will discuss some of the methods Experian uses to evaluate attribute performance. When considering any new attributes, the first method we use to validate statistical performance is to complete a statistical head-to-head comparison. This method incorporates the use of KS (Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistic), Gini coefficient, worst-scoring capture rate or odds ratio when comparing two samples. Once completed, we implement an established standard process to measure value from different outcomes in an automated and consistent format. While this process may be time and labor intensive, the reward can be found in the financial savings that can be obtained by identifying the right segments, including: • Risk models that better identify “bad” accounts and minimizing losses • Marketing models that improve targeting while maximizing campaign dollars spent • Collections models that enhance identification of recoverable accounts leading to more recovered dollars with lower fixed costs Credit attributes Recently, Experian conducted a similar exercise and found that an improvement of 2-to-22 percent in risk prediction can be achieved through the implementation of new attributes. When these metrics are applied to a portfolio where several hundred bad accounts are now captured, the resulting savings can add up quickly (500 accounts with average loss rate of $3,000 = $1.5M potential savings). These savings over time more than justify the cost of evaluating and implementing new credit attributes.  

By: Wendy Greenawalt In the second installment of my three part series, dispelling credit attribute myths, we will discuss why attributes with similar descriptions are not always the same. The U.S. credit reporting bureaus are the most comprehensive in the world. Creating meaningful attributes requires extensive knowledge of the three credit bureaus’ data. Ensuring credit attributes are up-to-date and created by informed data experts.  Leveraging complete bureau data is also essential to obtaining long-term strategic success. To illustrate why attributes with similar names may not be the same let’s discuss a basic attribute, such as “number of accounts paid satisfactory.” While the definition, may at first seem straight forward, once the analysis begins there are many variables that must be considered before finalizing the definition, including: Should the credit attributes include trades currently satisfactory or ever satisfactory? Do we include paid charge-offs, paid collections, etc.? Are there any date parameters for credit attributes? Are there any trades that should be excluded? Should accounts that have a final status of "paid” be included? These types of questions and many others must be carefully identified and assessed to ensure the desired behavior is captured when creating credit attributes. Without careful attention to detail, a simple attribute definition could include behavior that was not intended.  This could negatively impact the risk level associated with an organization’s portfolio. Our recommendation is to complete a detailed analysis up-front and always validate the results to ensure the desired outcome is achieved. Incorporating this best practice will guarantee that credit attributes created are capturing the behavior intended.  

By: Wendy Greenawalt This blog kicks off a three part series exploring some common myths regarding credit attributes. Since Experian has relationships with thousands of organizations spanning multiple industries, we often get asked the same types of questions from clients of all sizes and industries. One of the questions we hear frequently from our clients is that they already have credit attributes in place, so there is little to no benefit in implementing a new attribute set. Our response is that while existing credit attributes may continue to be predictive, changes to the type of data available from the credit bureaus can provide benefits when evaluating consumer behavior. To illustrate this point, let’s discuss a common problem that most lenders are facing today-- collections. Delinquency and charge-off continue to increase and many organizations are having difficulty trying to determine the appropriate action to take on an account because consumer behavior has drastically changed regarding credit attributes. New codes and fields are now reported to the credit bureaus and can be effectively used to improve collection-related activities. Specifically, attributes can now be created to help identify consumers who are rebounding from previous account delinquencies. In addition, lenders can evaluate the number and outstanding balances of collection or other types of trades.  This can be achieved while considering the percentage of accounts that are delinquent and the specific type of accounts affected after assessing credit risk. The utilization of this type of data helps an organization to make collection decisions based on very granular account data.  This is done while considering new consumer trends such as strategic defaulters. Understanding all of the consumer variables will enable an organization to decide if the account should be allowed to self-cure.  If so, immediate action should be taken or modification of account terms should be contemplated. Incorporating new data sources and updating attributes on a regular basis allows lenders to react to market trends quickly by proactively managing strategies.  

--by Mike Sutton In today’s collections environment, the challenges of meeting an organization’s financial objectives are more difficult than ever.  Case volumes are higher, accounts are more difficult to collect and changing customer behaviors are rendering existing business models less effective. When responding to recent events, it is not uncommon for organizations to take what may seem to be the easiest path to success — simply hiring more staff. Perhaps in the short-term there may appear to be cash flow improvements, but in most cases, this is not the most effective way to cope with long-term business needs. As incremental staff is added to compensate for additional workloads, there is a point of diminishing return on investment and that can be difficult to define until after the expenditures have been made. Additionally, there are almost always significant operational improvements that can be realized by introducing new technology.  Furthermore, the relevant return on investment models often forecast very accurately. So, where should a collections department consider investing to improve financial results? The best option may not be the obvious choice, and the mere thought can make the most seasoned collections professionals shutter at the thought of replacing the core collections system with modern technology. That said, let’s consider what has changed in recent years and explore why the replacement proposition is not nearly as difficult or costly as in the past. Collection Management Software The collections system software industry is on the brink of a technology evolution to modern and next-generation offerings. Legacy systems are typically inflexible and do not allow for an effective change management program. This handicap leaves collections departments unable to keep up with rapidly changing business objectives that are a critical requirement in surviving these tough economic times. Today’s collections managers need to reduce operational costs while improving these objectives: reducing losses, improving cash flow and promoting customer satisfaction (particularly with those who pose a greater lifetime profit opportunity).  The next generation collections software squarely addresses these business problems and provides significant improvement over legacy systems. Not only is this modern technology now available, but the return on investment models are extremely compelling and have been proven in markets where successful implementations have already occurred. As an example of modern collections technologies that can help streamline operations, check out the overview and brief demonstration that is on this link: www.experian.com/decision-analytics/tallyman-demo.html.  

--by Mike Sutton I recently interviewed a number of Experian clients to determine how they believe their organizations and industry peers will prioritize collections process improvement over the next 24 months. Additional contributions were collected by written surveys. Here are several interesting observations:   Improve Collections survey results: Financial services professionals, in general, ranked “loss mitigation / risk management improvement” as the most critical area of focus. Credit unions were the financial services group’s exception and placed” customer relationship management / attrition control” at the top of their priority list. Healthcare providers ranked both “general delinquency management” and “improving cash flow / receivables” as their primary area of focus for the foreseeable future. Almost all of the first-party contributors, across all industries polled, ranked “operational expense management / cost reductions” as being very important or at least a high priority. This category was also rated the most critical by utilities. “External partner management (agencies, repo vendors and debt buyers)” also ranked high, but did not stand out on its own, as a top priority for any particular group.     All of the categories mentioned above were considered important by every respondent, but the most urgent priorities were not consistent across industries.        

By: Kennis Wong In Part 1 of Generic fraud score, we emphasized the importance of a risk-based approach when it comes to fraud detection. Here are some further questions you may want to consider. What is the performance window? When a model is built, it has a defined performance window. That means the score is predicting a certain outcome within that time period. For example, a traditional risk score may be predicting accounts that are decreasing in twenty-four months. That score may not perform well if your population typically worsens in two months. This question is particularly important when it relates to scoring your population. For example, if a bust-out score has a performance window of three months, and you score your accounts at the time of acquisition, it would only catch accounts that are busting-out within the next three months. As a result, you should score your accounts during periodic account reviews in addition to the time of acquisition to ensure you catch all bust-outs.  Therefore, bust out fraud is an important indicator. Which accounts should I score? While it’s typical for creditors to use a fraud score on every applicant at the time of acquisition, they may not score all their accounts during review. For example, they may exclude inactive accounts or older accounts assuming those with a long history means less likelihood of fraud. This mistake may be expensive. For instance, the typical bust-out behavior is for fraudsters to apply for cards way before they intend to bust out. This may be forty-eight months or more. So when you think they are good and profitable customers, they can strike and leave you with seriously injury. Make sure that your fraud database is updated and accurate.  As a result, the recommended approach is to score your entire portfolio during account review. How often do I validate the score? The answer is very often -- this may be monthly or quarterly. You want to understand whether the score is working for you – do your actual results match the volume and risk projections? Shifts of your score distribution will almost certainly occur over time. To meet your objectives over the long run, continue to monitor and adjust cutoffs.  Keep your fraud database updated at all times.    

By: Kennis Wong In this blog entry, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a risk-based approach when it comes to fraud detection. Scoring and analytics are essentially the heart of this approach. However, unlike the rule-based approach, where users can easily understand the results, (i.e. was the S.S.N. reported deceased? Yes/No; Is the application address the same as the best address on the credit bureau? Yes/No), scores are generated in a black box where the reason for the eventual score is not always apparent even in a fraud database. Hence more homework needs to be done when selecting and using a generic fraud score to make sure they satisfy your needs. Here are some basic questions you may want to ask yourself: What do I want the score to predict? This may seem like a very basic question, but it does warrant your consideration. Are you trying to detect these areas in your fraud database? First-party fraud, third-party fraud, bust out fraud, first payment default, never pay, or a combination of these? These questions are particularly important when you are validating a fraud model. For example, if you only have third-party fraud tagged in your test file, a bust out fraud model would not perform well. It would just be a waste of your time. What data was used for model development? Other important questions you may want to ask yourself include:  Was the score based on sub-prime credit card data, auto loan data, retail card data or another fraud database? It’s not a definite deal breaker if it was built with credit card data, but, if you have a retail card portfolio, it may still perform well for you. If the scores are too far off, though, you may not have good result. Moreover, you also want to understand the number of different portfolios used for model development. For example, if only one creditor’s data is used, then it may not have the general applicability to other portfolios.

By: Kristan Keelan Most financial institutions are well underway in complying with the FTC’s ID Theft Red Flags Rule by: 1.  Identifying covered accounts 2.  Determining what red flags need to be monitored 3.  Implementing a risk based approach However, one of the areas that seems to be overlooked in complying with the rule is the area of commercial accounts.  Did your institution include commercial accounts when identifying covered accounts?  You’re not alone if you focused only on consumer accounts initially. Keep in mind that commercial credit and deposit accounts also can be included as covered accounts when there is a “reasonably foreseeable risk” of identity theft to customers or to safety and soundness. Start by determining if there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of identity theft in a business or commercial account, especially in small business accounts.   Consider the risk of identity theft presented by the methods used to open business accounts, the methods provided to access business accounts, and previous experiences with identity theft on a business account. I encourage you to revisit your institution’s compliance program and review whether commercial accounts have been examined closely enough.  

By: Kristan Keelan What do you think of when you hear the word “fraud”?  Someone stealing your personal identity?  Perhaps the recent news story of the five individuals indicted for gaining more than $4 million from 95,000 stolen credit card numbers?  It’s unlikely that small business fraud was at the top of your mind.   Yet, just like consumers, businesses face a broad- range of first- and third-party fraud behaviors, varying significantly in frequency, severity and complexity. Business-related fraud trends call for new fraud best practices to minimize fraud. First let’s look at first-party fraud.  A first-party, or victimless, fraud profile is characterized by having some form of material misrepresentation (for example, misstating revenue figures on the application) by the business owner without  that owner’s intent or immediate capacity to pay the loan item.  Historically, during periods of economic downturn or misfortune, this type of fraud is more common.  This intuitively makes sense — individuals under extreme financial pressure are more likely to resort to desperate measures, such as misstating financial information on an application to obtain credit. Third-party commercial fraud occurs when a third party steals the identification details of a known business or business owner in order to open credit in the business victim’s name.  With creditors becoming more stringent with credit-granting policies on new accounts, we’re seeing seasoned fraudsters shift their focus on taking over existing business or business owner identities. Overall, fraudsters seem to be migrating from consumer to commercial fraud.   I think one of the most common reasons for this is that commercial fraud doesn’t receive the same amount of attention as consumer fraud.  Thus, it’s become easier for fraudsters to slip under the radar by perpetrating their crimes through the commercial channel.   Also, keep in mind that businesses are often not seen as victims in the same way that consumers are.  For example, victimized businesses aren’t afforded the protections that consumers receive under identity theft laws, such as access to credit information.   These factors, coupled with the fact that business-to-business fraud is approximately three-to-ten times more “profitable” per occurrence than consumer fraud, play a role in leading fraudsters increasingly toward commercial fraud.

By: Kari Michel In August, consumer bankruptcy filings were up by 24 percent over the past year and are expected to increase to 1.4 million this year.  “Consumers continue to turn to bankruptcy as a shield from the sustained financial pressures of today’s economy,” said American Bankruptcy Institute’s Executive Director Samuel J. Gerdano. What are lenders doing to protect themselves from bankruptcy losses? In my last blog, I talked about the differences and advantage of using both risk and bankruptcy scores. Many lenders are mitigating and managing bankruptcy losses by including bankruptcy scores into their standard account management programs. Here are some ways lenders are using bankruptcy scores: • Incorporating them into existing internal segmentation schemes for enhanced separation and treatment assessment of high risk accounts; • Developing improved strategies to act on high-bankruptcy-risk accounts • In order to manage at-risk consumers proactively and • Assessing low-risk customers for up-sell opportunities. Implementation of a bankruptcy score is recommended given the economic conditions and expected rise in consumer bankruptcy. When conducting model validations/assessments, we recommend that you use the model that best rank orders bankruptcy or pushes more bankruptcies into the lowest scoring ranges.  In validating our Experian/Visa BankruptcyPredict score, results showed BankruptcyPredict was able to identify 18 to 30 percent more bankruptcy compared to other bankruptcy models.  It also identified 12 to 33 percent more bankruptcy compared to risk scores in the lowest five percent of the score range.  This supports the need to have distinct bankruptcy scores in addition to risk scores.  

By: Kennis Wong As I said in my last post, when consumers and the media talk about fraud and fraud risk, they are usually referring to third-party frauds. When financial institutions or other organizations talk about fraud and fraud best practices, they usually refer to both first- and third-party frauds. The lesser-known fraud cousin, first-party fraud, does not involve stolen identities. As a result, first-party fraud is sometimes called victimless fraud. However, being victimless can’t be further from the truth. The true victims of these frauds are the financial institutions that lose millions of dollars to people who intentionally defraud the system. First-party frauds happen when someone uses his/her own identity or a fictitious identity to apply for credit without the intention to fulfill their payment obligation. As you can imagine, fraud detection of this type is very difficult. Since fraudsters are mostly who they say they are, you can’t check the inconsistencies of identities in their applications. The third-party fraud models and authentication tools will have no effect on first-party frauds. Moreover, the line between first-party fraud and regular credit risk is very fuzzy. According to Wikipedia, credit risk is the risk of loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a loan or other line of credit. Doesn’t the definition sound similar to first-party fraud? In practice, the distinction is even blurrier. That’s why many financial institutions are putting first-party frauds in the risk bucket. But there is one subtle difference: that is the intent of the debtor.  Are the applicants planning not to pay when they apply or use the credit?  If not, that’s first-party fraud. To effectively detect frauds of this type, fraud models need to look into the intention of the applicants.

By: Kennis Wong When consumers and the media talk about fraud and fraud risk, nine out of ten times they are referring to third-party frauds. When financial institutions or other organizations talk about fraud, fraud best practices, or their efforts to minimize fraud, they usually refer to both first- and third-party frauds. The difference between the two fraud types is huge. Third-party frauds happen when someone impersonates the genuine identity owner to apply for credit or use existing credit. When it’s discovered, the victim, or the genuine identity owner, may have some financial loss -- and a whole lot of trouble fixing the mess. Third-party frauds get most of the spotlight in newspaper reporting primarily because of large-scale identity data losses. These data losses may not result in frauds per se, but the perception is that these consumers are now more susceptible to third-party frauds. Financial institutions are getting increasingly sophisticated in using fraud models to detect third-party frauds at acquisition. In a nutshell, these fraud models are detecting frauds by looking at the likelihood of applicants being who they say they are. Institutions bounce the applicants’ identity information off of internal and external data sources such as: credit; known fraud; application; IP; device; employment; business relationship; DDA; demographic; auto; property; and public record. The risk-based approach takes into account the intricate similarities and discrepancies of each piece of data element. In my next blog entry, I’ll discuss first-party fraud.

By: Ken Pruett I find it interesting that the media still focuses all of their attention on identity theft when it comes to credit-related fraud.  Don’t get me wrong.  This is still a serious problem and is certainly not going away any time soon.  But, there are other types of financial fraud that are costing all of us money, indirectly, in the long run.  I thought it would be worth mentioning some of these today. Although third party fraud, (which involves someone victimizing a consumer), gets most of the attention, first party fraud (perpetrated by the actual consumer) can be even more costly.  “Never pay” and “bust out” are two fraud scenarios that seem to be on the rise and warrant attention when developing a fraud prevention program. Never Pay A growing fraud problem that occurs during the acquisition stage of the customer life cycle is “never pay”.  This is also classified as first payment default fraud.  Another term we often hear to describe this type of perpetrator is “straight roller”. This type of fraudster is best described as someone who signs up for a product or service -- and never makes a payment. This fraud problem occurs when a consumer makes an application for a loan or credit card. The consumer provides true identification information but changes one or two elements (such as the address or social security number).  He does this so that he can claim later that he did not apply for the credit.  When he’s granted credit, he often makes purchases close to the limit provided on the account.  (Why get the 32 inch flat screen TV when the 60 inch is on the next store shelf -- when you know you are not going to pay for it anyway?) These fraudsters never make any payments at all on these accounts. The accounts usually end up in collections. Because standard credit risk scores look at long term credit, they often are not effective in predicting this type of fraud.  The best approach is to use a fraud model specifically targeted for this issue. Bust Out Fraud Of all the fraud scenarios, bust out fraud is one of the most talked about topics when we meet with credit card companies.  This type of fraud occurs during the account management phase of the customer lifecycle.  It is characterized by a person obtaining credit, typically a loan or credit card, and maintaining a good credit history with the account holder for a reasonable period of time.  Just prior to the bust out point, the fraudster will pay off the majority of the balance, often by using a bad check.  She will then run the card up close to the limit again -- and then disappear. Losses for this type of fraud are higher than average credit card losses.  Losses between 150 to 200 percent of the credit limit are typical.  We’ve seen this pattern at numerous credit card institutions across many of their accounts. This is a very difficult type of fraud to prevent. At the time of application, the customer typically looks good from a credit and fraud standpoint.  Many companies have some account management tools in place to help prevent this type of fraud, but their systems only have a view into the one account tied to the customer.  A best practice for preventing this type of fraud is to use tools that look at all the accounts tied to the consumer -- along with other metrics such as recent inquiries.  When taking all of these factors into consideration, one can better predict this growing fraud type.