Industries

This post continues the feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Mark Sofietti, Associate Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. In today’s market, the banking industry seems to be changing at a very rapid pace.  The current crisis that we are in, as an industry and as a nation, is forcing institutions to revisit risk management policies and procedures to make the appropriate changes needed to remain healthy and profitable.  However, the current crisis is not the only reason why institutions should focus on change management.  Change management needs to be appropriately handled in bad and good times.  Understanding change management is always a necessity to a well-run organization.  Whether it is a reorganization, a new software system, a new policy or moving to a new building, change can cause a great deal of stress and uncertainty -- but it can also cause benefits. So, as managers, you may be asking, “What can I do to ensure that positive changes are happening within my organization?  What are some of the items that I should consider when I am bringing about organizational change?” There are four necessary steps that need to be taken in order to improve the success of an initiative that is causing change to an institution. I covered two in my last post. Here are the additional steps. 3. Consider methods of change One method of change is the education of individuals about new ways of operating.  This method should be used when there is more resistance to change and when individuals lack a clear understanding or knowledge of the change being made.  Education may cause the implementation to take longer, but those involved will better understand the effects of the change. A second method is gathering participation from different levels and skill sets within the organizations.  Building a team should be used when there is the highest risk of failure due to change resistance and when more information needs to be gathered before an effective implementation can be completed. Negotiation is a method that is used when a group or person is going to be negatively affected by the change.  This method could alleviate the discomfort by giving the person or group some other benefit.  Negotiations could allow an organization to avoid resistance, but it may be very costly and time consuming to implement the change. The coercion change method is when a change is implemented with little room for diversion from the plan.  Employees are told what the change is going to be and they have to accept it.  This method should be used when speed is of the utmost importance, or if the change is not going to be easily accepted.  Most employees do not like this approach and it may cause resentment or it might cause staff members to leave. The final method of change uses manipulation, the conscious decision to share limited information about the change that is taking place.  This method should only be used when no other tactic will work, or if time or cost is major issues.  This approach is dangerous because it can lead to more problems in the future. 4. Create plan of action A plan should be created for the implementation of change to clearly address reservations and define the change strategy.  It should include internal and external audiences who can be affected by the change.  It is common to forget those who are indirectly impacted by the change -- and these audiences (customers, for example) may be the most important.  Objectives of the change need to be clearly outlined in the plan in order to understand how the new future state of the organization will look and operate.  The plan needs to be communicated to all those involved so that the transition can be understood and everyone can be held accountable.  The plan should be periodically revisited after implementation in order to review progress.  Creating a plan of action is a very important step to ensure that those who resisted the change do not revert back to their old habits. Achieving change is not an easy process, especially when time is not on your side.  If you take a second look at the change that you are trying to implement and do the necessary planning, you have a greater chance for success than if you or your organization fails to fully evaluate the consequences. Effective change management should be part of any financial risk management process. Take charge of your institution’s future through a calculated approach to change management and your organization will be in a better position for the next change that is coming around the bend.

Regardless of the specific checks and overall processes incorporated into your Red Flags Identity Theft Prevention Program, the use of an automated decisioning strategy or strategies will allow you to: Deliver consistent responses based on objective authentication results, while eliminating subjectivity often found in more manual review processes.  Save time and money associated with a manual review process currently attributed to Red Flag Rule referrals.  Provide examiners a detailed process flow including decision elements.  Create champion / challenger flows to test, compare and alter new strategies over time.  Revise, over time, the specific elements used in your decisioning to appropriately weight each from a fraud detection and/or compliance perspective. Experian's consumer authentication products provide hosted decisioning strategies that alleviate the burden on our clients associated with maintenance and development of those processes.  Whether you facilitate your own strategies or use a service provider's hosted strategies, it is important to ensure you are maximizing their ability to balance pass rates, fraud detection and compliance requirements.

We have talked about: the creation of the vision for our loan portfolios (current state versus future state) – e.g. the strategy for moving our current portfolio to the future vision. Now comes the time for execution of that strategy. In changing portfolio composition and improving credit quality, the discipline of credit must be strong (this includes in the arenas of commercial loan origination, loan portfolio monitoring, and credit risk modeling of course). Consistency, especially, in the application of policy is key. Early on in the change/execution process there will be strong pressure to revert back to the old ways and stay in a familiar comfort zone.  Credit criteria/underwriting guidelines will have indeed changed in the strategy execution. In the coming blogs we will be discussing: assessment of the current state in your loan portfolio; development of the specific strategy to effect change in the portfolio from a credit quality perspective and composition; business development efforts to affect change in the portfolio composition; and policy changes to support the strategy/vision.  

If the business is a creditor or a “financial institution” (defined as a depository institution) that offers covered accounts, you must develop a Program to detect possible identity theft in the accounts and respond appropriately. The federal banking agencies, the NCUA and the FTC have issued Guidelines to help covered entities identify, detect and respond to indicators of possible identity theft, as well as to administer the Program. A copy of the Red Flag Guidelines can be found: Federal Reserve Board – 12 C.F.R. pt 222, App. J Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – 12 C.F.R. pt 334, App. J FTC – 16 C.F.R. pt 681, App. A NCUA – 12 C.F.R. pt 717, App. J Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - 12 C.F.R. pt 41, App. J Office of Thrift Supervision - 12 C.F.R. pt 571, App. J  

They have started to shift away from time-based collections management activities (the 30-, 60-, 90-day bucket approach).  Instead, the focus is migrating towards the development of collections strategy that is based on the underlying risk of the individual – to look at how he is performing on all of the obligations in the total relationship to determine the likelihood of repayment and the associated activities that can facilitate that repayment.  They’ve found they can’t rely purely on traditional models anymore because consumer behavior has dramatically changed and an account only approach doesn’t reflect the true risk and value of the individual’s relationship.

The credit reporting agencies will not identify Red Flags, as such, on a credit report. However, there may be certain information on a credit report that you have determined to be an indicator of possible identity theft and have incorporated into your Program, such as a consumer fraud alert or a notice of address discrepancy. In addition, the Red Flag Guidelines specify that a credit report indicating a pattern of inconsistent or unusual recent activity might be a Red Flag.

By: Tom Hannagan   Part 6 Peer Group 2 fee income Non-interest income again, as a percent of average total assets, declined to .86 percent from .95 percent in 2007. For Peer Group 2 (PG2), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.04 percent of assets in 2005. A smaller, non-interest bearing deposit base with no other new and offsetting sources of fee income will lead to increased pressure on this metric. Operating expenses Operating expenses also put more pressure on earnings on these smaller banks. They increased from 2.79 percent to 2.83 percent of average assets. That’s four basis points on the negative. Historically, this metric has been flattering for this size bank and usually moves up or down from year-to-year. It was almost equal at 2.82 percent of assets in 2004. As a result of the sizeable decline in margins, the continued decline in fee income and the slight increase in operating expenses PG2’s efficiency ratio lost ground from 59.52 percent in 2007 to only 64.72 percent in 2008. That means that every dollar in gross revenue cost them almost 65 cents in administrative expenses this year. This metric averaged 56 cents in 2005/2006. It’s amazing how close these numbers are for banks of very different size where you would expect clear economies of scale. The total impact of margin performance, fee income and operating expenses, plus the huge increase in provision expense of 59 basis points leads us to a total decline in pre-tax operating income of .96 percent on total assets. That is a total decline from 1.58 percent pre-tax ROA in 2007 to .64 percent pre-tax ROA, a loss of 61 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007. My same conclusion as above would hold regarding the pricing of risk into bank lending (although the smaller banks didn’t perform a badly as the larger in this regard). Although all 490 banks are declining in all profit metrics, the smaller banks seem to have an edge in pricing loans, but not deposits. Although up dramatically in 2007, and even more in 2008 for both groups, the PG2 banks seem to be suffering fewer credit losses relative to their asset size than their larger brethren. Both groups have resulting huge profit declines, but the largest banks are under the most pressure through this period. An interesting point, with higher loan yields and fewer apparent losses, is whether PG2 banks are somewhat better at risk-based pricing (for whatever reason) than the largest bank group. Results are results. The 2009 numbers aren’t expected to show a lot of improvement as the general economy continues to slow and credit and financial risk management issues continue. We’ll probably comment on 2009 as the quarterlies become available this year.  

For all you folks who, like me, waited until the last minute to knock out a term paper or class project in school, here is a friendly reminder…Yes, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pushed out the enforcement deadline of the Red Flags Rule to May 1, 2009.  Yes, a sigh of relief was heard across compliance officers and operations managers nationwide.  However, you should still keep a few things in mind as we approach May 1.  First, per the FTC, "many entities also noted that because they generally are not required to comply with FTC rules in other contexts, they had not followed or even been aware of the rulemaking, and therefore learned of the requirements of the rule too late to be able to come into compliance by November 1, 2008."  Those of you, who have not been subject to FTC enforcement in the past are quite possibly still subject to the Red Flags Rule based on your institution maintaining 'covered accounts' per the definition in the Red Flags Rule itself.  Double check if you think otherwise. Second, the FTC was clear in stating that "this delay in enforcement is limited to the Identity Theft Red Flags Rule (16 CFR 681.2), and does not extend to the rule regarding address discrepancies applicable to users of consumer reports (16 CFR 681.1), or to the rule regarding changes of address applicable to card issuers (16 CFR 681.3)."  So, while May 1 is still a few weeks away, if you are accessing consumer credit reports, for example, you should already have a formal written and operational process to detect and respond to address discrepancies on those credit reports.

Red Flags Rule I've heard more than one institution claim that they may limit and even reduce the identity elements (perhaps down to just name and address) that are captured during consumer applications or other transactions.  Their rationale is that the fewer identity elements they request or require during these processes, the less information they will need to authenticate as part of their Red Flags Identity Theft Prevention Program.  While this argument seems logical on the surface, I would suggest that if securely gathered/stored and appropriate to the nature of your business, additional data elements such as Social Security Number (SSN), date of birth and phone number can actually allow you to accomplish a few things to your benefit.  1.  Analysis of our consumer authentication products shows that contributing SSN, date of birth, and phone (in addition to name and address) to an authentication process, will actually improve your ability to positively authenticate a consumer via an overall risk-based strategy.  2.  The use of additional data elements, such as the phone number, can unlock additional data sources for use in verifying not only that phone number, but the inquiry name and address as well.  3.  Just because you don't capture certain identity elements, doesn't mean the risk goes away.  In providing additional identity elements for authentication, you can gain a more holistic view of a consumer - be that good, bad or ugly.  It’s better to figure this out up front versus down the road when bills go unpaid and the bad guys scatter.

By: Prince Varma Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices. So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk? Great question! The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of: client penetration/growth; client retention; and client credit risk mitigation. How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”? (this is where the sales guy stuff comes in) From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios. From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again. How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?” That should be read as … penetration and retention Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include: - evaluating the scope of the opportunity; - isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy; - determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and - being willing to let the “bad deals” walk. In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies. After all what would you expect from a business development guy…

By: Tom Hannagan   Part 5 This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are some findings for the two largest groups, covering 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk. Peer Group 2 (PG2) consists of 305 reporting banks between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets. PG2’s Net Interest Income was 5.75 percent of average total assets for the year. This is also down, as expected, from 6.73 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense also decreased from 3.07 percent in 2007 to 2.31 percent for 2008.  Net Interest Margin, also declined from 3.66 percent in 2007 to 3.42 percent in 2008, or a loss of 24 basis points. These margins are 31 bps or 10 percent higher than found in Peer Group 1 (PG1), but the drop of .24 percent was much larger than the .05 percent decline in PG1. As with all banks, Net Interest Margins have shown a steady chronic decline, but the drops for PG2 have been coming in larger chunks the last two years -- -24 basis points last year after dropping 16 points from 2006 to 2007. Behind the drop in margins, we find loans yields of 6.53 percent for 2008, which is down from 7.82 percent in 2007. This is a decline of 129 basis points or 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.70 percent in 2007 to 2.75 percent in 2008. This 95 basis point decline represents a 26 percent lower cost of interest-bearing deposits. Again, with a steeper decline in interest costs, you would think that margins should have improved somewhat. It wasn’t meant to be. We see the same two culprits as we did in PG1. Total deposit balances declined from 78 percent of average assets to 77 percent which means again, that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits continued an already steady decline from 5.58 percent of average assets in 2007 to 5.03 percent. This, of course, resulted in fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size and a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits. Check my next blog for more on an analysis of Peer Group 2’s fee income, operating expenses and their use of risk-based pricing.  

By: Tom Hannagan Part 4 Let’s dig a bit deeper into why Peer Group 1’s margins didn’t improve. We see two possible reasons: Total deposit balances declined from 72 percent of average assets to 70 percent. This means that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund their assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits declined from 4.85 percent of average assets to 4.24 percent. So, fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size, along with a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits, appear to have made the difference. Fee income Non-interest income, again as a percent of average total assets, was down to 1.12 percent from 1.23 percent in 2007. This was a decline of 9 percent. For Peer Group 1 (PG1), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.49 percent of assets in 2005. A lot of fee income is deposit based and largely based on non-interest bearing deposits. So, the declining interest-free balances, as a percent of total assets, are a source of pressure on fee income and have a negative impact on net interest margins. Operating expenses Operating expenses constituted more bad news as they increased from 2.63 percent to 2.77 percent of average assets. Most of the large scale cost-cutting didn’t get started early enough to favorably impact this number for last year. Historically, this metric has moved down, irregularly, as the size of the largest banks has grown. This number stood at 2.54 percent in 2006, for instance. We saw increase in both 2007 and again in 2008. As a result of the decline in margins and the larger percentage decline in fee income, while operating costs increased, the Peer Group 1 efficiency ratio lost ground from 57.71 percent in 2007 up to 63.70 percent in 2008. This 10 percent increase is a move to the bad. It means every dollar in gross revenue [net interest income + fee income] cost them almost 64 cents in administrative expenses in 2008. This metric averaged 55 cents in 2005/2006. The total impact of changes in margin performance, fee income, operating expenses and the 2008 increase in provision expense of 87 basis points, we arrive at a total decline in pre-tax operating income of 1.23 percent on total assets. That is a total decline of 80 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007 of 1.53 percent pre-tax ROA to the 2008 result for the group of only .30 percent pre-tax ROA. It would appear that banks have not been utilizing pricing enough credit risk into their loan rates.  This would be further confirmed if you compared bank loan rates to the historic risk spreads and absolute rates that the market currently has priced into both investment grade and below-investment-grade corporate bonds. These spreads have decreased some very recently, but it is predicted that more credit risk is present than bank lending rates would indicate.

Part 3 Reducing operational and overhead costs starts with the automation of tasks that would otherwise be performed by a human resource. By leveraging an advanced segmentation approach, it is possible to better identify accounts that will not require collector intervention. While automation is not a new concept to collections, significant benefits of modern systems include: • enabling more functions to be automated; • effectiveness of the automated functions to be validated; and • more changes made per year versus legacy systems. Fixing a bad phone number: The old way To illustrate effective automation, let’s use an example where an account is found to have a bad phone number. A common approach to this problem might be for the outbound collector to route the account to a skip specialist who can perform research. This often has the receiving party starting the process after the nightly batch process has transferred the account across departments. If a phone number is found, the account may be manually routed back to an outbound queue and if not, a no-contact letter may be generated. Additionally, there are tasks that need to be performed such as noting accounts that consume a collector’s time. Fixing a bad phone number: The new way A more efficient and cost-effective approach would be for the employee identifying the need for a new number to click a pre-defined button to let the collections system know of the issue. The system could then automatically call out to an external data source to: • collect the new number; • repopulate the appropriate field; • reroute the account back to the most appropriate outbound queue; • log a history of all automated functions performed, and • do all of this within just a few seconds! If the appropriate number cannot be located, the system would know which letter to send and then route the account to the most appropriate holding queue. Reducing operational costs After automation, the operational costs are further reduced by identifying which actions can be effectively replaced by lower-cost options that yield the same results, or even eliminating actions that present no substantial value. For example, why make a call when a letter will suffice? And what happens if we subsequently replace that letter with a text message or take no action at all? Intelligent features of modern systems such as champion/challenger testing can be employed to support a continuous learning process that increases the financial benefits of automation as experience and knowledge is gained. As new automation is introduced and validated as beneficial, other improvement theories can be tested and subsequently abandoned or adopted. Considering the possible impact of automation and action reductions on cost savings let’s assume that three dial attempts are made on the average delinquent account in the first 30 days at a cost of 25 cents each and on the fourth attempt there is a right party contact, which costs an additional $2.50 (assuming the talk time is five minutes). Adding one letter at 75 cents, we have a total cost to collect of $4.00 before the account hits 31 days past due. With 250,000 customers entering collections each month, we can save $200,000 each month in the early stage alone with just a 20 percent improvement. This result could easily be achieved by reducing talk time and eliminating unnecessary actions or unproductive call attempts. Annually that adds up to approximately $2.5 million dollars in savings, in this example. Champion/challenger tests, as well as, the improved functionality of modern systems can also be extended beyond the in-house work stream. Evaluating and comparing external agencies can significantly improve agency performance as well as enable the lender to better manage placement costs. For example, if a lender allocates 1,000 accounts to an external agency each month, with an average balance of $3,000, the total dollars allocated annually is $36 million. If 22 percent of the debt is collected and a 25 percent commission is charged, the net to the lender is nearly $6 million. Improving that return by a mere 4 percent through better allocation strategies, which is a conservative goal, we add another million to the bottom line each year. By factoring in the ability of next generation collections systems to automate most aspects of the placement process itself, including recalling accounts, we further improve efficiencies, free up valuable resources and allow management greater control of the process. Additional benefits of functionally rich modern systems also enable management to grant external resources various levels of remote access to the collections systems to better monitor activities and ensure that transactional data is properly captured. In addition to granting external agencies remote access, modern collections systems can also enable collectors to work from home-based workstations to further reduce operational costs. Many industry analysts see this as an emerging trend over the next few years, particularly when productivity can be monitored in real-time. My next blog will continue the discussion on the benefits of next generation collections systems and will provide details on improved change management processes.  

Here are a few more frequently asked questions. 1. Am I a “creditor” under the rule? The term “creditor” has the same meaning as under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and is defined as a person who regularly participates in credit decisions, including, for example, a mortgage broker, a person who arranges credit or a servicer of loans who participates in “workout” decisions. The term “credit” is defined, as in the ECOA, as the right granted by a creditor to defer payment for goods or services. It is important to note that commercial, as well as consumer, credit accounts may be covered by the Rule. 2. We are an insurance company that uses credit reports to underwrite insurance. Does the Red Flags Rule apply to us? The Red Flag Rule applies to creditors and depository institutions and should not apply to an insurer when engaged in activities related to insurance underwriting. To the extent that you extend credit, however, you may be covered. For example, you may wish to examine whether you permit consumers to finance their premiums; whether you extend credit to vendors, independent agents or other business partners; or whether you extend credit in connection with your investment activities, including real-estate investments. 3. I am an auto dealer. Does the rule apply to me? If the business extends auto credit to consumers or arranges auto credit for consumers, the Red Flag guidelines may apply.  

By: Tom Hannagan Part 3 I believe it is quite important to compare your bank or your investment plans in a financial institution to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same, believe it or not. In this column, we use the averages. Again, look for the differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers, while the other half are naturally worse. It can tell a useful story. This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are the findings for the two largest groups that cover 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk. Peer Group 1 (PG1) is made up of the largest 189 reporting banks or those with over $3 billion in average total assets for 2008. Interest income was 5.25 percent of average total assets for the period. This is down, as we might expect, based on last year’s decline in the general level of interest rates from 6.16 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense was also down from 2.98 percent in 2007 to 2.06 percent average for the year. Net Interest Margin, the difference between the two metrics, was down from 3.16 percent in 2007 to 3.11 percent as a percentage of total assets. It should be noted that Net Interest Margins have been in a steady, chronic decline for at least 10 years, with a torturous regular drop of 2 to 5 basis points per annum in recent years. Last year’s drop of five basis points is in line with that progression and it does add to continuing difficulty in generating bottom-line profits. To find out a bit more about why margins dropped, especially in light of the steady increase in lending over the same past decade, we looked first at loan pricing yields. For PG1 these averaged 6.12 percent for 2008, down (again, expectedly) from 7.32 percent in 2007. This is a drop of 120 basis points or a decline of 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.41 percent in 2007 to 2.39 percent in 2008. This 102 basis point decline represents a 30 percent lower interest expense on interest-bearing deposits. Based only on these two metrics, it seems like margins should have improved and not declined for these banks. Check my next blog for more on the reasons for Peer Group 1’s drop in margins and an analysis of the fee income and operating expenses for these institutions.