Industries

Here we are in March, 2009, four months after the Red Flags Rules deadline OR two months until the Red Flags deadline…depending on your glass-half-full / glass-half-empty view of the world.  I can say with confidence that at this point in time, the Identity Theft Red Flags 'discussion' with our clients and the market at large continues in full earnest.  That said, however, the nature of our discussions has changed substantially.  A few months ago, the needs expressed by the market centered on education around the Red Flags Rule, Red Flag compliance and it's applicability to various markets and account types. I find that the majority of my daily conversations on the subject now regard efficiencies in process and cost combined with effectiveness and customer experience. Most of our clients 'get' what they need to be doing such as identifying, detecting and responding to Red Flag conditions.  Where we are still working closely with our clients is in how they can optimize their policies and procedures to ensure that the majority of Red Flag conditions are detected and reconciled in singular automated steps.  As I've said in previous blogs, detecting these conditions is the easy part. It's how you reconcile (a.k.a. respond to) those conditions that makes the difference in your bottom line. As May 1 approaches, now is a great time to be monitoring each step in your process in an effort to identify those areas that may still have room for efficiency gains and improved customer experience.

Address discrepancies aren't the end of the road, but they sure can be a bump in it. One of the handful of mandatory elements in the Red Flag guidelines, which focus on FACTA Sections 114 and 315, is the implementation of Section 315.  Section 315 provides guidance regarding reasonable policies and procedures that a user of consumer reports must employ when a consumer reporting agency sends the user a notice of address discrepancy.  A couple of common questions and answers to get us started: 1.  How do the credit reporting agencies display an address discrepancy? Each credit reporting agency displays an “address discrepancy indicator,” which typically is simply a code in a specified field. Each credit reporting agency uses a different indicator. Experian, for example, supplies an indicator for each displayable address that denotes a match or mismatch to the address supplied upon inquiry. 2.  How do I “form a reasonable belief” that a credit report relates to the consumer for whom it was requested? Following procedures that you have implemented as a part of your Customer Identification Program (CIP) under the USA PATRIOT Act can and should satisfy this requirement. You also may compare the credit report with information in your own records or information from a third-party source, or you may verify information in the credit report with the consumer directly. In my last posting, I discussed the value of a risk-based approach to Red Flag compliance.  Foundational to that value is the ability to efficiently and effectively reconcile Red Flag conditions…including addressing discrepancies on a consumer credit report. Arguably, the biggest Red Flag problem we solve for our clients these days is in responding to identified and detected Red Flag conditions as part of their Identity Theft Prevention Program.  There are many tools available that can detect Red Flag conditions.  The best-in-class solutions, however, are those that not only detect these conditions, but allow for cost-effective and accurate reconciliation of high risk conditions.  Remember, a Red Flag compliant program is one that identifies and detects high risk conditions, responds to the presence of those conditions, and is updated over time as risk and business processes change. A recent Experian analysis of records containing an address discrepancy on the credit profile showed that the vast majority of these could be positively reconciled (a.k.a. authenticated) via the use of alternate data sources and scores.  Layer on top of a solid decisioning strategy using these elements, the use of consumer-facing knowledge-based authentication questions, and nearly all of that potential referral volume can be passed through automated checks without ever landing in a manual referral queue or call center.  Now that address discrepancies can no longer be ignored, this approach can save your operations team from having to add headcount to respond to this initially detected condition.  

By: Tom Hannagan Part 2 In my last post, I started my review of the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest financial institution peer groups through the end of 2008. Now, lets look at the resutls relating to credit cost, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings. Again, as you look at these results, I encourage you to consider the processes that your bank currently utilizes for credit risk modeling and financial risk management. Credit costs More loans, especially in an economic downturn, mean more credit risk. Credit costs were up tremendously. The Peer group 1 banks reported net loan losses of .89% of total loans. This is an increase from .28% in 2007, which was up from an average of 18 basis points on the portfolio in 2006/2005.  The Peer group 2 banks reported net loan losses of .74%. This is also up substantially from 24 basis points in 2007 and an average of 15 basis points in 2006/2005. The net loan losses reported in the fourth quarter significantly boosted both groups’ year-end loss percentages above where they stood through the first three quarters last year. Loss allowance accounts Both groups also ramped up their reserve for future expected losses substantially. The year-end loss allowance account (ALLL) as a percent of total loans stood at 1.81% for the largest banks. This is an increase of almost 50% from an average of 1.21% in the years 2007/2004. Peer group 2 banks saw their reserve for losses go up to 1.57% from an average of 1.24% in the years 2007/2004. The combination of covering the increased net loan losses and also increasing the loss reserve balance required a huge provision expenses. So, loan balances were up even in the face of increased write-offs and expected forward losses. Impacts on earnings Obviously, we would expect this provisioning burden to negatively impact earnings. It did, greatly. Peer group 1 banks saw a decline in return on assets to a negative .07%. This is just below break-even as a group. The average net income percentage stood at .42% of average assets at the end of the third quarter. So, the washout in the fourth quarter reports took the group average to a net loss position for the year. The ROA was at .96% in 2007 and an average of 1.26% in 2006/2005. That is a 111% decline in ROA from 2007. Return on equity also went into the red, down from 11.97% in 2007. ROE stood at 14.36% in 2005. For the $1B to $3B banks, ROA stood at .35%. This is still a positive number, however, it is way down from 1.08% in 2007, 1.30% in 2006 and 1.33% in 2005. The decline in 2008 was 67% from 2007. ROE for the group was also down, at 4.11% from 12.37% in 2007. The drops in profitability were not entirely the result of credit losses, but this was by far the largest impact from 2007. The seriously beefed-up ALLL accounts would seem to indicate that, as a group, the banks expect further loan losses, at least through 2009.  These numbers largely pre-dated the launch of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the tier one funding it provided in 2008. But, it is clear that banks had not contracted lending for all of 2008, even in the face of mounting credit issues and a declining economic picture. It will be interesting to see how things unfold in the next several quarters.

By: Tom Hannagan Part 1 It may be quite useful to compare your financial institution's portfolio risk management process or your investment plans , to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same -- believe it or not. Here are the averages. You should look for differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers and the other half may be naturally worse. As promised, I have again reviewed the Uniform Bank Performance Reports for the two largest peer groups through the end 2008. The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) is a compilation of the FDIC, based on the call reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC reports peer averages for various bank size groupings and here are a few notable findings for the two largest groups that covers 494 reporting banks. Peer group 1 Peer group 1 consisted of 189 institutions over $3 billion in average total assets for the year. Net loans accounted for 67.31% of average total assets, which is up from 65.79 % in 2007. Loans, as a percent of assets, have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the largest banks was also up to 96% from 91% in 2007 and 88% in both 2006 and 2005. So, it appears these banks were lending more in 2008 as an allocation of their total asset base and relative to their deposit sources of funding. In fact, net loans grew at a rate of 9.34% for this group, which is down from the average growth rate of 15.07% for the years 2005 through 2007.  The growth rate in loans is down, which is probably due to tightened credit standards. However, it is still growth. And, since total average assets also had growth of 11.58% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances increased at the largest banks. Peer group 2 Peer group 2 consisted of 305 reporting financial institutions between $1B and $3B in total assets. The net loans accounted for 72.96% of average total assets, up from 71.75% in 2007. Again, the loans as a percent of total assets have increased steadily since at least 2004. The loan-to-deposit ratio for these banks was up to 95% from 92% in 2007 and an average of 90% for 2006 and 2005. So, these banks are also lending more in 2008 as a portion of their asset base and relative to their deposit source of funding. Net loans grew at a rate of 10.48% for this group in 2008 which is down from 11.94% growth in 2007 and down from an average growth of 15.04% for 2006 and 2005. And, since total average assets also had growth of 10.02% in 2008, the absolute dollars of loan balances also increased at the intermediate size banks. Again here, the growth rate in loans is down, probably due to tightened credit standards, but it is still growth and it is at a slightly more aggressive rate than the largest bank group. Combined, for these 494 largest financial institutions, loans were still growing through 2008 both as a percentage of asset allocation and in absolute dollars. Tune in to my next blog to read more about the results shown relating to credit costs, loss allowance accounts and the impacts on earnings.

At which stage of the application process does the Red Flags Rule apply? The Red Flag Rule would apply whenever you detect a Red Flag in connection with an application. This could occur as soon as you receive an application, for example: if the application appears to have been altered or forged; or the consumer’s identification appears to be forged or is inconsistent with the information on the application. Is the social security number (SSN) check a requirement? No, but an invalid SSN may be a Red Flag – i.e., an indicator of possible identity theft – and obtaining and verifying a SSN may be a reasonable means of application risk management to detect this Red Flag when opening accounts. You may be able to utilize your existing procedures under your Customer Identification Program under the USA PATRIOT Act.  

What to do when you see a Red Flag. Your Identity Theft Prevention Program should include appropriate responses when you detect a Red Flag. You must assess whether the Red Flag evidences a risk of identity theft. If so, your response must be commensurate with the degree of risk posed. Depending on the level of risk, an appropriate response may include contacting your applicant, not opening a new account or even determining that no response is necessary.  

By: Tom Hannagan Part 1 Beyond the risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital position, which is directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk.  We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. Business risk includes: A variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making; Governance considerations; Executive behavior (for lack of better terminology); Management succession events or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business. Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a 20% infusion of added tier 1 capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department does not have voting rights like common shareholders, but the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form includes at least 35 pages of terms, plus the required Letter Agreement, Schedules attached to the Letter Agreement and at least five significant Annex’s to the Purchase Agreement. It’s NOT an easy, quick or fun read. In the Recitals section, it states that the bank: “agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive terms as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy” and, later, “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of residential mortgages as appropriate to strengthen the health of the U.S. economy.” Fortunately, if you’re a banker, these topics are not (currently) revisited elsewhere in the document, period. However, these are examples of the new shareholder effecting business decision making without the need to be on the Board of Directors, or voting common shares. The Agreement covers a number of other requirements and limitations, such as executive compensation, dividend payments, other capital sourcing and retention of bank holding company status. None of these are particularly onerous, but they must be taken into account by management. Visit my next post to read about the very interesting Amendment clause that may represent an open-ended business portfolio risk management decision for the future.

We have been hearing quite a bit about the ponzi scheme that was created and managed by Bernie Madoff.  Almost $50 billion dollars was taken from those that were considered to be sophisticated and definitely not the typical type to be scammed.  So, what created the environment that allowed such large sums of money to be lost in such a basic con game as a ponzi scheme?  I believe there are a few basic factors that prompted these seemingly sophisticated people to invest in this ill-fated “investment.” A strong desire to generate investment returns when the typical channels were not delivering. The reputation(s) of the existing client list -- If they invested why shouldn’t I? The thought that if it paid off with smaller dollar investments, just think what could be made with larger dollars! Hmmm!  Sounds like how we got ourselves into today’s credit situation.  Basically, we were distracted by the items noted above and ignored the warning signs. Putting the items above into credit industry terms it can be summed up as follows: We have to continue to grow and we are pressured to find more opportunities.  If we go lower in the credit quality spectrum, it can generate immediate volume from the existing application volume. Other financial institutions have gone into this type of lending and they aren’t showing any signs of significant distress in their portfolios.  We need to do the same.  (Everyone in the herd in favor of this action please respond by saying “Moo.”) Our test portfolio has performed acceptably, so let’s increase the volume. Let’s continue the correlation between these two “problems.”  In the Madoff ponzi scheme, there were warning signs that cropped up - some earlier than others. These included: In 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission received a letter from an outside money manager which warned of a possible scheme. In 2005, the Bostonian submitted an 18-page document to the SEC citing 29 red flags and indicated some level of corruption within Madoff’s investment company. The SEC’s own earlier investigation conducted in 1999, included an acknowledgement that they had received “credible allegations” but these allegations were ignored. So, what were the signs that were in front of us but we simply chose to ignore? Were the portfolios turning over so fast that we could not actually gather statistically valid data to support performance? Since we were selling off the loans, either individually or in bulk, did we ignore the actual risk that was taken by the industry? Were we appropriately monitoring the portfolio growth and performance, utilizing risk reduction and risk avoidance techniques, doing regular rescores and tracking potential behavioral issues? Whether the signs were visible to us or not, the fact remains that they existed in the past and they will likely exist in the future.  As we continue to clean up the mess of our past, we need to consider a few items: What we did in the past will no longer be acceptable going forward. We must change. We must improve. Regulatory pressures will increase and changes will continue to be made. We will not have the luxury of time to respond to these pressures and/or changes. We must act now. What is a financial institution to do?  Well, the worst thing we can do is wait for the regulators to tell us what to do because that is simply too late.  We need to act and act now. Assess the risk management methods that were employed in the past and determine deficiencies. Note the gaps between the historical tools and data sources compared with the updated credit decisioning tools and sources available in the industry. Develop a plan for implementing the new risk reduction methods and tools. Determine the estimated lift and manage/monitor your performance against your estimates. Don’t forget about the new additions to the portfolio. Once you have the existing risk identified, you should make the appropriate adjustments to the product risk parameters and terms and conditions to improve the overall quality of the new portfolio. Overall, the worst thing that we can do is nothing. Remember, “Those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” George Santayana, a philosopher, essayist, poet, and novelist

How do I know which Red Flags apply to me? The Red Flag guidelines that will apply to you depend on a number of factors including: The types of covered accounts you offer and how those accounts may be opened and accessed Your previous experiences with identity theft In order to determine the applicable Red Flags, you must consider these factors as well as various sources and categories of Red Flags identified in the Guidelines. There are many resources available to help you gain the upper hand on Identity Theft Red Flags. I encourage you to visit this site for more information including a white paper, webinar, data sheet and more.  

The difference between market risk and credit risk By: Tom Hannagan Market risk is different than credit risk. The bank’s assets are mostly invested in loans and securities (about 90% of average assets). These loans and securities have differing interest rate structures – some are fixed and some are floating. They also have differing maturities. Meanwhile, the bank’s liabilities, deposits and borrowings also have differing maturities and interest rate characteristics. If the bank’s (asset-based) interest income structure is not properly aligned with the (liability-based) interest expense structure, the result is interest rate risk. As market rates change (up or down), the bank’s earning are impacted (positively or negatively) based on the mismatch in its balance sheet structure. The bank can offset market risk by purchasing interest rate swaps or other interest rate derivatives. The impact of insufficient attention to interest rate risk can damage earnings and may, again, negatively affect the bank’s capital position. So, ultimately, the bank’s risk-based capital acts as the last line of defense against the negative impact from, you guessed it, unpredictable variability – or “risk.” That is why equity is considered risk-based capital. Good risk management, predicting and risk-based pricing leads to safer earnings performance and equity position.

By: Tom Hannagan In my past postings, we’ve discussed financial risk management, the role of risk-based capital, measuring profitability based on risk characteristics and the need for risk-based loan pricing (credit risk modeling). I thought it might be worthwhile to take one step back and explain what we mean by the term “risk.” “Risk” means unpredictable variability. Reliable predictions of an outcome tend to reduce the risk associated with that outcome. Similarly, low levels of variability also tend to reduce risk. People who are “set in their ways” tend to lead less risky lives than the more adventuresome types. Insurance companies love the former and charge additional premiums to the latter. This is a terrific example of risk-based pricing. Financial services involve risk. Banks have many of the same operational risks as other non-financial businesses. They additionally have a lot of credit risk associated with lending money to individuals and businesses. Further, banks are highly leveraged, borrowing funds from depositors and other sources to support their lending activities. Because banks are both collecting interest income and incurring interest expense, they are subject to market, or interest rate, risk. Banks create credit policies and processes to help them manage credit risk. They try to limit the level of risk and predict how much they are incurring so they can reserve some funds to offset losses. To the extent that banks don’t do this well, they are acting like insurance companies without good actuarial support. It results in a practice called “adverse selection” – incorrectly pricing risk and gathering many of the worst (riskiest) customers. Sufficiently good credit risk management practices control and predict most of the bad outcomes most of the time, at least at portfolio levels. Bad outcomes (losses) that are not well-predicted, and therefore mitigated with sufficient loan-loss reserves, will negatively impact the bank’s earnings and capital position. If the losses are large enough, they can wipe out capital and result in the bank’s failure.

During a recent real-time survey of 850 representatives of the financial services industry: only 36 percent said that they completely understood the new Identity Theft Red Flags Rule guidelines and were prepared to meet the deadline. 60 percent said that they had just started to determine their approach to Red Flag compliance.

By: Tom Hannagan Part 3 This post continues my discussion of the reasons for going through the time and trouble to analyze risk-based pricing for loans. I mentioned before that the second general major justification for going through the effort to risk-adjust loan pricing as a normal part of the lending function is financial. I thought it might help put this into perspective by offering rough numbers that relate to risk-adjusted profit performance, bottom line earnings and expand on the premise that risk has a cost. Lending, in the leveraged/banking sense, involves credit risk, market (interest rate) risk and operational risk. The fourth area, the risk of unexpected loss, is covered by capital. Unmitigated risk will eventually impact earnings and common equity.  The question is when and by how much? It’s important to understand that the cost of risk mitigation efforts depend on the various risk characteristics of the bank’s loans and loan portfolio. The differential cost of market risk As an example, a floating rate loan that reprices every month involves little market risk, requiring little if any expense to offset. Compare it to a five-year fixed rate, interest-only loan that involves greater exposure to market risk. That risk costs something to offset. The difference in annualized marginal funding cost ranges widely depending on the steepness of the yield curve on the date the loan is closed. The difference between Federal Home Loan Banks 30-day rates and five-year bullet funding today, for instance, is close to 200 basis points. If risk-based loan pricing models don’t reflect this difference by using a matched marginal funding cost, the bank is voluntarily assuming some or all of the market (or interest rate) risk. Multiply an implied 200 bps risk-based funding cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-free funding expense is $2,000,000. Multiply that by the average life of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference that the bank is assuming. And that’s just for the market risk. The implied cost of credit risk A loan with a pass risk rating of ‘2’ involves a lower likelihood of defaulting than a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘4.’ The lower risk (grade 2) loan, therefore, involves less of an Allowance for Loan Lease and Losses reserve requirement and an implied lower provisioning expense than the higher risk (grade 4) loan. Depending on the credit regimen and net loss experience of a given bank, the difference in the implied annualized expected loss due to credit risk could be 40 bps or more. Multiply the implied 40 bps credit risk cost difference by $100M in average loan balances and the implied annualized additional risk-adjusted credit expense is $400,000. Multiply that by the average tenor of the portfolio to get the full risk-adjusted cost difference to the bank. The implied difference in administrative (or operations) expenses These expenses include all mitigated (insured) operational risk. An owner occupied commercial mortgage is normally much less expensive to monitor than a line of credit backing a construction project. Those cost differences often range into several thousand dollars per annum. If, in our example of the $100M portfolio, our average credit is $400K, then we have around 250 loans. These loans multiplied by $3,000 in fully-absorbed annual non-interest expense differences would amount to $750K. A competent risk-adjusted loan pricing effort would take this cost difference into account. Again, multiply that yearly amount by the average life of the portfolio to get the full cost difference that the bank is incurring. In reality, the three sample portfolios above would not overlap perfectly. The total actual assets from the above examples would lie between $100M and $300M. However, the total pretax cost difference of these three sample risk-based costs adds up to $3.15M per annum. The after-tax negative impact on risk-adjusted earnings is therefore about $2M yearly. So, the impact on ROA would be between 2.00% (if the three portfolios overlapped perfectly, for $100M in total assets) down to .67% (if there was no overlap, for $300M in total assets). This is a huge difference in earnings, on a risk-adjusted and fully cost-absorbed basis. Finally, the amount of risk-based capital needed to back loans with differing risk characteristics, for purposes of unexpected loss, can be substantially different. This can be looked at as a difference in the implied cost of capital or in the performance ratio of ROE. In a simple application, the implied required equity might range from say 6% on the lower-risk loans up to 8% for moderate risk (average pass grade risk rating). If the portfolio in question is earning 1% ROA, the difference in risk-based equity would result in an ROE of either 12.5% for the higher risk loans versus 16.7% for the lower risk loans. The differences in fully risk-based ROE, or RAROC, could easily be more dramatic than this. As stated before, if these differences are not “priced” into the loans somehow, the bank is not getting paid for the risk it is incurring or it is charging the lower risk borrowers a rate that pays for the added risk expenses of the higher risk borrowers. The business risk to the bank then becomes losing the better clients over time rather than attracting the riskier deals. An economic look at performance We are not talking in terms of “normal” accounting practices or “typical” quarterly reporting periods. We do use general ledger numbers to start the analysis process by relying on actual balances, rates and maturities. But, GAAP doesn’t address risk. So the risk adjustments are a more “economic” look at performance. Eventually, the risk reduction approach and the GL-based results will even out. The question is not “if” risk will eventually surface, but when and how it will manifest itself in GL results. We’ve seen a lot of this in the news the past eighteen months – and there’s likely more to come as the economy is in a downturn phase. Going through the effort is worth it Once risk is created by making a loan or placing a bet, someone owns it. The reason to go through the effort to price loans (and relationships) on a fully risk-adjusted basis is to understand the impact of risk at the only point in time when you can do something about getting paid for it – at the time the loan is agreed upon. After that, the bank is pretty much along for the ride. Risk-adjusted pricing is smart banking. It not only puts some teeth in the bank’s already existing risk management policies, it is justifiable to the client and it makes sense to most lending officers.

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Stephanie Butler, manager of Process Architects in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. Are you tired of the economic doom and gloom yet?  I am.  I’m not in denial about what is happening -- far from it.  But, we can wallow or move forward, and I chose to move forward.  Let’s look at a few of the many lessons that can be learned from the year and some action steps for the future. 1. Collateral does not make a bad loan good  Remember this one? If you didn’t relearn this in 2008, you are in trouble.  Using real estate as collateral does not guarantee a loan will be paid back.  In small business/commercial lending, we should be looking at time in business, repayment trends and personal credit.  In consumer lending, time with an employer, time at the residence and net revolving burden are all key.  If these are weak, collateral will not make things all better. 2. Balance the loan portfolio  Too much of a good thing is ultimately never a good thing.  First, we loaded our portfolios with real estate because real estate could never go bad.  Now, financial institutions are trying to diversify out of real estate and move into the “next great thing.”  Is it consumer credit cards, commercial C&I, or small business lines of credit?  It’s anyone’s guess.  The key is to balance the portfolio.  A balanced portfolio can help smooth the impact of economic trends and help managing uncertainty.  We all know that policy requires monitoring industry concentrations.  But, balancing the portfolio means more than that.  You also need to look at the product mix, collateral taken, loan size and customer location.  Are you too concentrated in unsecured lending?  How about lines of credit?  Are all of your customers in three zip codes? 3. Proactive vs. reactive The days of using past dues for portfolio risk management are gone.  We need to understand our customers by using relationship management and looking for proactive markers to anticipate problems.  Whether this is done manually or through the use of technology, a process must be in place to gather data, analyze and anticipate loans that may need extra attention.  Proactive portfolio risk management can lessen potential charge-offs and allow the bank to renegotiate loans from a position of strength. Be sure to check my next post as Stephanie continues with tips on how to get back to risk management basics.

Part 2 My colleague, Prince Varma, Senior Client Partner -- Portfolio Growth and Client Management, shares his advice on the best practices for portfolio risk management in these trying times. Boy; this is an interesting time. Banks today are at a critical threshold -- the biggest question that they are trying to answer is, "How do we continue to grow -- or at least avoid contracting -- without sacrificing profitability or credit quality?” The urge to overcompensate, or engage in ultra conservative lending practices, must be resisted.  That said, we are already seeing a trend in which mid-sized and regional lenders are abandoning mid-tier credit. This vacuum is being filled by community banks and credit unions which are implementing aggressive risk-based pricing programs in order to target the small business market. These organizations are also introducing "safe and secure" campaigns that specifically target existing clients of banks in the news -- and attempting to entice those clients to switch over. We are strongly urging banks to engage in an analysis of their existing portfolios in order to pinpoint opportunities for expanding their relationships with existing key clients. Many senior executives are expressing apprehension about undertaking new projects given current levels of uncertainty.  Our best advice is two-fold.. First, focus on identifying those areas where process remediation will have long term and sustained value. Second, do not allow uncertainty to paralyze your internal improvement efforts.  Strong business cases lead to good decisions; don't let fear and apprehension cloud what you know needs to be done.